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The Wealth of a Nation: Mexico's Efforts to
Attract Foreign Investment in
the Energy Sector
ALEXANDER COCHRAN*

I. Introduction
In December of 2013, a radical development occurred in the history of the
Republic of Mexico. This occurrence was the amendment of the Mexican
constitution to allow for the participation of foreign entities and investors in
the country's energy industry. Such a change was especially startling, given
what transpired in the country's not so distant past. In 1938, the Mexican
government famously nationalized the oil industry and expropriated the
assets of the foreign concerns that had been engaged in the extraction of
hydrocarbons from the oil rich areas of the country. The nationalization
also resulted in the birth of a state-owned oil company that had the exclusive
right to explore for subterranean deposits of fossil fuels, to extract such
substances, and to refine them into fuel. The events of 1938 were perceived
as an assertion of Mexico's sovereignty and were celebrated with patriotic
fervor on March 18th of each year. However, the amendments that once
again allowed for the involvement of foreign entities were not a random
manifestation, rather it was the recognition that the energy industry had
grown stagnant and had failed to modernize. The President, Enrique Pena
Nieto, was among reform minded individuals who recognized that change of
this magnitude was necessary in order for Mexico to be able to fully utilize
its abundant supply of hydrocarbons. This comment will delve into the legal
means and mechanisms by which Mexico intends to woo foreign investment
to aid in the efforts to modernize the nation's energy industry as well as
touch on changes that have already taken effect.

H.

A Brief History of Oil in Mexico

While a true discussion of oil in Mexico would necessarily begin in the
eons before dinosaurs roamed the earth, this section will not recount a brief
history of geologic time. Instead, it will focus on the events that transpired
between the discovery of petroleum in Mexico, and the events that led to the
nationalization of Mexico's oil industry and the expropriation of the assets of
foreign oil concerns by the Mexican federal government in 1938. Though
* Alex Cochran is a 2018 J.D. candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law. I would like to
thank my editors for their assistance during this process and dedicate this article to Professors
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the development of the nascent Mexican oil industry in the 20th Century
could arguably be characterized as an example of economic imperialism as
practiced by the Europeans and the United States of America, such a
characterization would not take into account the practical realities of what
occurred during this time period. As discussed herein, the development of
energy production in Mexico played a considerable and essential role in the
modernization of the Mexican state. Furthermore, the conflict between the
foreigner oil producers and the Mexican labor unions that resulted in the
nationalization of the Mexican oil industry took place not in a vacuum, but
rather was of global significance when it occurred. However, the events of
1938 have left a distinct impression in the collective Mexican psyche. In
order to better understand the future possibilities of the energy industry in
Mexico, one must first understand the events that transpired in the not so
distant past.

A.

THE

ORIGINS OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN

MEXICO

In the early 1900's, during the long presidency of Porfirio Diaz, oil was
first discovered in commercial quantities in Mexico., Diaz was a strongman
who silenced political opposition, but who also sought to modernize the
Mexican state. 2 Since the development of the economy and infrastructure
were part of his goals, Diaz sought to induce foreign oil producers to
develop an oil industry in Mexico.3 At that time, the only private companies
that possessed the ability to produce oil in commercial quantities were from
the United States and Great Britain.4 To encourage these foreign entities to
invest in developing the industry in Mexico, Diaz changed Mexican law,
primarily doing away with property and mining law based upon old Spanish
law codes.5 The new laws emulated those of Texas, which afforded a fee
simple landowner exclusive ownership of any sub-soil hydrocarbons.6
Additionally, the tax system was changed to favor foreign investment in the
oil industry.7 Ultimately, Standard Oil of the United States and Mexican
Eagle Petroleum, originally a British concern sold to Royal Dutch Shell,
would become the dominant oil producers in Mexico during the early 20th
Century.8 These foreign entities built the nation's oil industry from the
ground up. 9
1. Mitchell Gray, Mexico's Oil Expropriation: The U.S. Wanted Diaz Gone, OILPRO, oilpro
.com/post/12324/mexico-oil-expropriation-us-wanted-diaz-gone (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
2. Mitchell Gray, Mexico's 1938 Oil Expropriation, OILPRO, oilpro.com/post/12235/mexico1938-oil-expropriation (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Gray, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Gray, supra note 2.
9. Id.
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1938

In 1938, Mexico became the first nation in the history of the world to
nationalize the oil industry within the country.1o Lazaro Cardenas, the
President of Mexico at that time, did not make the decision to nationalize
the oil industry and to expropriate the assets of the foreign concerns in a fit
of pique."1 Rather, it was the climatic end to a period of contentious
relations between the Mexican Government and the foreign firms.
The end of the Mexican Revolution marked the end of an era in which
strongmen dominated the political landscape.12 In the case of the foreign oil
concerns, this development heralded the end of an era in which favorable
accommodations or concessions would be made to them by the
government. 13 The first indication of this new reality was the enactment of a
new constitution by the Mexican government in 1917.14 In the Constitution
of 1917, it expressly stated that the owner of oil and minerals in Mexico was
the federal government.15 Furthermore, the ability of foreigners to own
assets within Mexico was restricted.16 The cessation of the oil companies
cordial relationship with the government would prove to be the least of their
worries during the 1920s.
During the 1920s, the biggest problem that the foreign oil concerns had
to deal with in Mexico was that of the labor unions representing the oil
workers. The union representing the oil workers was popular and was not
afraid of conflict nor of organizing massive strikes in order to achieve its
aims. 1 7 This oil workers union was the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros
de la Republica Mexicana (STPRM).18 While there had been strikes in
1915-1917 that had been quickly resolved, in 1924 STPRM called for a
strike that forced Mexican Eagle Petroleum to concede to an eight hour
workday, a wage increase and the signing of the first collective bargaining
agreement in industry history in Mexico.19 The demands of the STPRM
and the workers would only increase from there.
In addition to the issues with the government and the union representing
the oil workers, the foreign oil companies had to deal with the increasing
10. David Blackmon, Mexico's Complex History with Foreign Oil Investments, FORBES (Apr. 13,

2013 9:44 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/08/13/Mexico's-complex-historywith-foreign-oil-investment/#641dee35506.
11. Noel Maurer, The Empire Struck Back: Sanctions and Compensation in the Mexican Oil

Expropriation of 1938 591 (Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Working Paper No. 10-108,
2010).
12. Gray, supra note 2.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Gray, supra note 2.
17. Maurer, supra note 11, at 599.

18. Id.
19. Id.
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unprofitability of their operations in Mexico.20 During the 1920s, the rate of
production of oil in Mexico began to decline steeply, primarily due to the
seepage of salt water into the wells.21 Additionally, the oil companies could
not find enough new oil deposits to maintain the production rates. 22 Other
issues led to a sharp rise in the increase of production costs, chief among
them the cost of extraction, and the need to invest in costly pipeline and
export facility construction. 23 Readily available investment capital was scarce
due to the falling productions, rates, and consequently, the concerns that
were publicly traded suffered a sharp decline in the value of issued shares.24
Thus, by the time the 1930's began, to own an oil production operation in
Mexico was to own a money pit, not a profit center. By then, Mexico was
also on its way to becoming a backwater in the oil industry; Venezuela and its
considerable oil reserves was the focus of most foreign oil producers in the
1930's.25

In 1936, a new dispute broke out between the foreign oil concerns and the
STPRM.26 The union's demands were for a $2.3 million increase, a massive
benefits package including health insurance, and most importantly, control
over all hiring decisions in the entire oil industry, with the exception of a
mere 110 positions.27 The oil companies were aghast, for they claimed that
these demands would raise annual costs by $10.7 million and that they could
not give up control over the ability to hire and fire workers.28 The
negotiations between the STPRM and the foreign oil concerns became
hopelessly deadlocked, and strikes were rampant between 1936-1938.29
Hoping to defuse the situation, Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas
appointed a special arbitration commission.30 Instead of quelling the
hostilities, the commission decided that the oil companies could indeed
afford the compensation package that the STPRM demanded.3' On March
2, 1938, the Federal Labor Board announced it would grant the STPRM
more control over the hiring process and a wage and benefit increase that
was worth $7.3 million.32 The Mexican Supreme Court upheld the Labor
Board's decision, and set a compliance deadline for the foreign oil
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
2 9.

Id. at 594
Gray, supra note 2.
Maurer, supra note 11, at 594.
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 595-96.
Gray, supra note 2.
Maurer, supra note 11, at 599.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600.
Id.

30. Id.
31. Maurer, rupra note 11, at 599.

32. Id.
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companies.33 The deadline was initially set to be March 7, but was later
extended to March 14.34

The events in Mexico did not occur in a vacuum. Events occurring
elsewhere in the world made the outcome of the situation in Mexico
critically important to the oil concerns. In 1927, Spain nationalized all oil
production.35 Elsewhere in Latin America, Uruguay changed its laws to
favor the state-owned oil company at the expense of foreign producers, and
Chile threatened expropriation of foreign oil industry assets in 1932.36
Similarly, there was increasing tension in oil-rich Venezuela between the
government and the oil companies.37 The foreign oil concerns were
determined not to give in to the demands of the Mexican government, for
they hoped to set a precedent which would discourage other countries from
altering the concession agreements that were in place or threatening
expropriation of the assets of the foreign concerns.38 In the mind of the oil
companies, to concede in Mexico would be perceived as weakness in
Venezuela, where they had far more profitable operations.39 In addition to
such grave external concerns, the oil companies could not afford the $7.3
million compensation package.40 Financial analysis of all foreign owned oil
operations in Mexico indicates that the concerns collectively earned $3.7
million in 1936.41 If depreciation and other expenses are added back to the
$3.7 million, it is likely that the total net cash flow of the foreign oil
concerns was about $7 million in total, far less than the $7.3 million
compensation package demanded by the Mexicans.42 On March 15, the
individual oil companies informed the Mexican authorities that they would
not comply with the Supreme Court's ruling; in response, the Mexican
government suspended all contracts with foreign entities.43
The foreign oil companies responded to this deadline by closing their
wells and moving oil stored in the oil fields to export facilities at various port
cities, notably Tampico.44 Disgruntled Mexican workers began seizing the
oil companies' facilities and shut down their pipelines.45 Shortly thereafter,
President Cardenas announced the expropriation of the assets of all foreign
oil firms in Mexico.46 To this date, March 18, the day of Cardenas'
announcement, is celebrated as National Oil Expropriation date throughout
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 600-601.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
Maurer, .upra note 11, at 599.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602-603.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Maurer, supra note 11, at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
Gray, supra note 2.
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the country. 47 Cardenas then created a state-owned oil company, Petroleos
Mexicanos (Pemex) to oversee all production of oil for the Mexican
economy.4 8 The situation was not resolved until 1941, when the United
States imposed a settlement agreement to which the Mexican government
agreed.49 In 1942, the British and American companies received a collective
settlement of $23.9 million.50 This settlement represented roughly onethird of the total property values which the Mexican government had
seized.51

III.

Current State of the Mexican Energy Industry

Mexico, like all modern, industrialized nations, has a tremendous need for
fossil fuels with which to power its utilities, factories, and transportation
networks. The fact that between 1938 and 2013 there was no dramatic
implosion of the Mexican energy industry and the beseechment of foreign
concerns to return indicates that at the very least, Pemex and other state-run
entities have proven themselves to be at least competent in the extraction
and refinement of hydrocarbons into useable fuel. The following section
will discuss recent performance and current state of Pemex, as well as touch
on untapped or underutilized hydrocarbon resources that are ripe for
extraction, production, and distribution.
A.

PEMEX CURRENTLY

Since its creation in 1938, following the expropriation of foreign assets
and the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry, Pemex has been more
than just a state-owned company; it has been an integral part of the Mexican
state. 52 Not only is Pemex Mexico's biggest company, but more
importantly, it is Mexico's biggest taxpayer.ss Revenue derived from Pemex

currently comprises one-third of the budget of the Mexican federal
government.ss
47. Stephanie McCrummen, WASHINGTON POST, Mexican PresidentProposes historic changes to
State-owned Pemex oil monopoly, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/Mexican-PresidentProposes-historic-changes-to-state-owned-pemex-oil-monopoly/2013/08/12/7F848dc-038011e3-bfc5-406b928603b2_story.html?utm term=.ac3aece6c5fb (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
48. Richard H.K. Vietor & Haviland Sheldal-Tomason, Mexico's Energy Reform 2 (Harvard
Business School Case Collection No. 717-027, 2017) (revised Feb. 2017).
49. Maurer, supra note 11 at 607.
50. Blackmon, supra note 10.
51. Maurer, supra note 11 at 591.
52. Adam Williams, WASHINGTON POST, Pemex, Mexico's State oil giant, braces for a [sic] the
Country's New energy landscape, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/pemex-mexicosstate-oil-giant-braces-for-a-the-countrys-new-energy-landscape/2014/06/04/07d
(last visited
June 7, 2014).
53. Id.
54. Christoper Helman, Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto is leading an oil revolution worth billions,
FoRB-s (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Christopherhelman/2013/10/
30/mexicos-enrique-pena-nieto-is-leading-an-oil-revolution-worth-billions/#5d4a35ca2453.
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Despite the importance of Pemex to the Mexican state, the general
perception is that the company is riddled with corruption.55 Contracts
awarded by Pemex are awarded primarily to firms associated with powerful
political connections.56 Employment at Pemex is extremely desirable due to
the longevity of its employees, so much so that to gain employment, an
individual must purchase a job.57 Consequently, Pemex employs very few
engineers or skilled laborers when compared with unskilled workers with
guaranteed lifetime employment.58 The largess of Pemex does not end with
retirement, for generous pensions are awarded, which has resulted in the
company having unfunded pension liabilities.59 In essence, Pemex more
resembles the prototypical Latin American bureaucracy in which corruption
is endemic and efficiency is low, than it does a major player in the global
energy industry.60
In the short term, Pemex has far more pressing issues to contend with
than rooting out corruption. There has been a significant decline in the rate
of production in Pemex's oil fields, and in recent years, there have been
more losses than gains at the end of the fiscal year. 61 Starting in 2005,
production began declining, and in March 2014, the company suffered its
lowest monthly production since 1995.62 In fact, it was disclosed that in
2015, overall production of petroleum was down seven percent, and
currently produces, on average, just 2.27 million barrels per day.63 The
downturn in production has exacerbated other issues that Pemex faces.
Pemex also has significant cash flow issues. Company pension liabilities
cannot be met, and its total indebtedness to its various suppliers is measured
in the billions of dollars.- While the losses would be extremely concerning
by themselves, the losses are exacerbated by the actions of the Mexican
government towards Pemex. For example, in 2013, Pemex suffered a loss of
thirteen billion dollars for the entire year.6s However, in the first fiscal
quarter of that very same year, the Mexican government had Pemex pay fifty
percent of its gains in that period, approximately sixteen billion dollars, as
taxes to the federal treasury. 66 The losses by Pemex have grown increasingly
worse in recent years, for example, in the final quarter of 2015, Pemex
suffered ten billion dollars in losses.67 Such a drastic decrease in revenue
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
3:38
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

McCrummen, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.
Williams, supra note 52.
Matt Egan, Mexico forced to rescue drowning oil giant Pemex, CNN MoNEY (Apr. 14, 2016,
PM), money.cnn.com/2016/04/14/investing/Mexico-rescue-oil-company-Pemex/.
Vietor, supra note 48, at 3.
Egan, supra note 59.
Williams, supra note 52.
Egan, supra note 59.
Id.
Williams, supra note 52.
Id.
Egan, supra note 59.
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forced the Mexican government to give Pemex 4.4 billion dollars in early
2016 in order for the company to be able to meet its various obligations and
to continue production operations.68 To continue such practices would be
disastrous, for it is evident that Pemex is no longer the steady, reliable source
of income that the Mexican state desperately needs it to be. Currently, the
company is more of a liability than an asset.
By serving as a veritable cash cow for the Mexican government, Pemex has
not had the ability to re-invest its earnings. The result being that Pemex has
not developed 'or purchased the most current technology for either
exploration or drilling operations.69 An additional result of Pemex's lack of
possession of advanced exploration or drilling technology is that Pemex
engineers and other skilled workers do not have the technical expertise
necessary to operate such equipment, nor have they been exposed to such
technology.70 Pemex also lacks the technology for the extraction of shale oil
and gas as well as for the exploration and extraction deep water oil fields.71
The lack of modern technology and expertise, systemic and endemic
corruption, when combined with a precarious financial situation, could not
come at a more unfortunate time for Pemex. To date, Pemex has largely
been dependent upon shallow water oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico to
supply the country's petroleum needs.72 In fact, much of the oil has been
derived from a single field in the shallow waters of the Gulf.73 In 1971, the

Cantarell oil field was discovered in the shallow portion of the Bay of
Campeche.74 The subsequent development of the Cantarell oil field was the
event that led to Mexico's emergence as an oil exporter. 75 However, in the
Cantarell field alone, production has fallen almost ninety percent between
1979 and 2016.76 At its peak, the Cantarell field was producing over two

million barrels a day, but now produces less than 400,000 barrels a day.77
In short, Pemex is an entity that is encumbered by current liabilities and
by the fact that it is treated as a quasi-bureaucratic entity, as opposed to a
private enterprise. The company, as it currently operates, is not able to
reinvest in capital improvements or retain its earnings. Instead, Pemex is
treated as a virtual pass-thru entity by the Mexican government. It is not an
entity equipped to spearhead the discovery and development of new
hydrocarbon deposits within the country due to its many weaknesses.
68. Id.
69. McCrummen, supra note 47.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Helman, supra note 54.
McCrummen, supra note 47.
Williams, supra note 52.
Id.
Helman, supra note 54.
Williams, supra note 52.
McCrummen, supra note 47.
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RESERVES AND POSSIBILITIES

Despite the dire straits in which Pemex finds itself, there are many reasons
for hope for the future of the energy industry in Mexico. Pemex claims that
untapped oil reserves in Mexico could potentially total 113 billion barrels,
with over twenty-six billion barrels located in deep waters in the Gulf of
Mexico.78 A conservative estimate has valued such reserves to be worth
trillions of dollars.79 Furthermore, it was announced in September 2016 that
six new oil deposits had been discovered in the Gulf.so The two deep water
deposits are particularly important, for between the two, the estimated
reserves are between 140-160 million barrels of oil.81 Additionally, Pemex
has estimated that there are over 460 trillion cubic feet of unexploited shale
gas within the country.82
Significant shale deposits exist in northern Mexico, for part of the Eagle
Ford Shale Formation that has been successfully exploited in the United
States extends well into the northern Mexican states.83 The portion of the
Eagle Ford that extends into northern Mexico is known as the Burgos Basin,
located in the state of Tamaulipas.8 The Burgos Basin is the most promising
prospect among Mexico's yet to be developed shale oil industry. This area is
estimated to contain roughly 6.3 billion of the 13.1 billion estimated barrels
of technically recoverable shale oil in the country.85 The bulk of Mexico's
shale deposits are in various basins and geological formations along the
coastal region adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico.86 While the coastal basins are
thought to contain the majority of the country's shale gas and oil reserves,
the geological formations in which the shale rock is located are either too
deep within the earth or ridden with faults.87 Other than drilling a few test
wells, Pemex has not made the discovery and production of shale a priority,
for it simply lacks the budgetary resources to fund large-scale exploration
and extraction activities.88

Despite the seeming abundance of shale oil and gas, the extraction of
these energy sources perfectly encapsulates the potential of the energy
industry in Mexico: resource rich, but woefully deficient in terms of
78. Williams, supra note 52.

79. Id.
80. Pemex Findssix new oil deposits in gulf MExIco NEws DAILY, http://www.mexiconewsdaily
.com/news/pemex-finds-six-new-oil-deposits-in-gulf/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
8 1. Id.
82. Williams, supra note 52.
83. Gray, supra note 2.
84. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: Mexico, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION AGENcY,

11-2. https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/Mexico

2013.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).

85. Id.
86. Id. at 11-7.
87. Id. at 1-2-11-7.
88. Kent Harrington, Mexico's Huge, Untouched Shale-Oil Fields Lure Wildcatters and Criminals,
AIcHE, https://www.aiche.org/chenected/2016/01/Mexicos-huge-untouched-shale-oil-fieldslure-wildcatters-and-criminals (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
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infrastructure. The lack of an existing infrastructure network has
detrimental effects on the potential development of a shale oil industry
within the country. For instance, the shale oil formations in the Burgos
Basin are known as "technically recoverable reserves," meaning that oil and
gas can be produced with contemporary technology.89 Just because an
energy deposit is technically recoverable does not also mean it is
economically recoverable as well, meaning that it could be extracted
profitably at the current market price.90 The extraction process is extremely
dependent upon the existence of infrastructure in order to be economically
viable.91 In particular, pipelines to convey oil and gas from field operations,
abundant water resources to utilize for the hydraulic fracturing process, and
service sector contractors are critical to keeping costs to a minimum for
producers of shale oil and gas. 9 2 Mexico currently lacks developed pipeline
networks and roads in close proximity to the country's shale rich areas. 93
Additionally, there is a complete lack of a shale service sector industry,
meaning that there are not contractors that could supply fracturing or other
necessaries to producers seeking to extract oil and gas from the shale
formations.94 Security is also a matter of grave concern, for in the Burgos
Basin, drug related violence and pipeline theft are rampant.95 With drilling
costs estimated between ten and twenty million dollars per individual well,
the security related concerns as well as the lack of critical infrastructure must
be ameliorated in order for the extraction of shale oil and gas to be perceived
as economically viable by the foreign producers or investors that Mexico
seeks to attract. 96
Among the most serious issues in the contemporary energy industry is
that of rampant pipeline theft.97 In fact, Mexico is one of the countries that
has been severely impacted by such thefts.98 On average, 20,000 barrels per
day of oil are stolen throughout the entire country, which by comparison, is
three times the daily consumption of the city of Washington, D.C.99
Furthermore, the ongoing reform of the energy industry is likely to make
this sphere of criminal endeavor potentially more lucrative than it already
is.1oo
89. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: Mexico, supra, note 84, at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Harrington, supra note 88.
94. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: Mexico, supra note 84, at 11-2.
95. Harrington, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. Ricardo Martinez, Mexico loses millions of dollars daily tojifel theft, Piu (Oct. 17, 2016, 3:30
PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-10-17/mexico-loses-millions-dollars-daily-fuel-theft.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Nacha Cattan & Eric Martin, Drug CartelsAre Looting Mexican Gas Pipelines, BLOOMERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-011 2 /drug-cartels-are-looting-Mexico-s-gas-stations-.
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Pipeline theft has become an increasingly popular illegal activity since the
beginning of the second millennium.1ol It is an enterprise with extremely
low start-up costs, for the basic equipment to tap into a pipeline can be
purchased for less than $10,000.102 Also, the risk of being apprehended is
extremely low.103 At first, pipeline theft was conducted by expert criminal
organizations, but it has since become a valuable side business for narcotics
trafficking organizations.- The cartel known as Los Zetas was the first
drug trafficking organization to expand into this sphere.1o5 Los Zetas are
located in the oil rich states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz, and their level of
success in siphoning fuel from pipelines encouraged their competitors to
enter the industry as well.106 The cartels are better positioned for success
than independent operators, as they have both the financial means and
connections to purchase sophisticated equipment and bribe officials.o7
Furthermore, the cartels consider pipeline theft such a lucrative endeavor
that they fight each other over dominion of the oil rich areas. 08 By 2013,
pipeline theft was so rampant that there was an average of one illegal siphon
for every fourteen kilometers of transportation pipelines in existence.109

The combined efforts of the federal government, Pemex, and law
enforcement have been unable to reduce or prevent the theft of oil from
pipelines.110 The enactment of laws that lengthen the mandatory sentence
for pipeline thieves to a minimum of fourteen years have not deterred
thieves in the slightest, as the rate detention and prosecution for oil theft is
extremely low."' Pemex attempted to make theft an unprofitable activity by
only shipping unrefined petrochemicals through the pipelines, but this
ultimately failed to discourage the thieves.112 Thstead, the criminals changed
tactics themselves, and shifted their focus to target refineries or oil storage
facilities where it is even more convenient to obtain oil.113 Shipping the oil

by truck has not worked as a countermeasure either, as the hijacking of fuel
trucks proved to be no challenge for the organizations involved in oil
101. Martinez, supra note 97.
102. Cattan & Martin, supra note 100.
103. Mexico: Fuel Theft to Increase Costs For Foreign Investors, PGI INTELLIGENCE, https://pgiintelligence.com/news/getNewsltem/Mexico-Fuel-theft-to-increase-costs-for-foreign-invest
ors/677 (last updated Oct. 20, 2017).
104. Cattan & Martin, supra note 100.
105. James Bargent, Stealing Fuel From Pipelines Big Business in Mexico, INSIGHT CRIME, WWW
.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/stealing-fuel-from-pipeines-big-business-Mexico
(last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).
106. Id.
107. Mexico: Fuel Theft to Increase Costs For Foreign Investors, supra note 103.
108. Why Drug Cartelsare Stealing Mexico's Fuel, STRATFOR, (Oct. 21, 2015, 9:15 AM), https://
www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-drug-cartels-are-stealing-Mexicos-fuel.
109. Bargent, supra note 105.
110. Mexico: Fuel Theft to Increase Costs For Foreign Investors, supra note 103.
111. Id.
112. Martinez, supra note 97.
113. Id.
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theft.114 Pemex lacks the ability to safeguard the pipelines, refineries, or
storage facilities, primarily due to the entity's struggle to create revenue and
to hold onto it.115 Pemex employees are more likely than not either
complicit or outright participants in the thefts.116 Similarly, law
enforcement officers are also believed to be involved, for there is no other
explanation as to their inability to prevent theft or detain suspects.11 7 Only
the military has had some success when deployed to protect pipelines, but
the utilization of the military in this capacity is extremely expensive and has
only occurred due to the fact that Pemex is an appendage of the national
government."t 8
The continuance of pipeline theft is inimical to the effort to reform the
Mexican energy industry. As highlighted above, endemic corruption and the
lack of willingness to enforce the law have had the effect of making the theft
of oil a virtually consequence-free criminal enterprise. In fact, theft is so
widespread and lucrative that the national black market for fuel is currently
estimated to range from two to four billion dollars annually.119 Fuel, as
opposed to other commodities, cannot be easily traced to its point of
origin.120 Due to the complexity of supply chains, companies in the
midstream and downstream sectors of the energy industry often unwittingly
purchase stolen fuel.121 Such a reality is dangerous for both domestic entities
and foreign ones looking to operate in Mexico. For example, Shell,
Marathon, and ConocoPhillips were sued by Pemex in an American court
over allegations that the entities had purchased stolen natural gas condensate
from narcotics traffickers.122 Although the lawsuit was dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, the incident demonstrates just how obscure the origin
of fuel can be even to sophisticated participants in the energy industry.123
This issue may become even more serious as the process of energy reform
continues, especially with regards to how the retail sale of fuel is set to
evolve. One facet of energy reform is that Pemex will no longer be the only
retailer of fuel, nor the only allowed supplier to privately held retail
operations.124 Before privatization efforts began, the Mexican Association of
Gas Station Owners estimated that stolen fuel comprised thirty percent of
daily gasoline sales.125 Furthermore, the price of gasoline is set to rise in the
near future.126 In early 2017, the government announced that it would end
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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subsidizing the sale of gasoline, which it previously had to the tune of nine
billion dollars annually.127 The federal government hopes that the cessation
of the massive subsidy will encourage private investment in the retail fuel
business, a development which is thought will aid the government's efforts
to downsize Pemex.128 However, the likely end result of the price increase in
gasoline will be that the theft of oil from pipelines will increase.129 Stolen
fuel can be sold at relatively cheap wholesale prices, and retailers will be
incentivized to purchase discounted fuel even if it is illegal, as they know full
well that the consumers are going to be more cost-conscious than ever. 30
Pipeline theft and an established market for illicit petroleum will continue to
be a reality unless the federal government is able to effect change in this
area.

IV.

Overall Goals of Energy Reform

As discussed herein, Mexico has the perplexing combination of valuable,
untapped oil and natural gas reserves within its borders and international
waters, but lacks the capital, technology and expertise necessary to extract
such hydrocarbons.131 The existing model of energy exploration, extraction,
production, and distribution has grown stagnant, and in large part, is the
exact reason why Mexico faces a conundrum of this magnitude. However, it
is expected that the goals of energy reform pertain to much more than just
the modernization of the energy industry.132
Ultimately, the primary goal of all energy reform measures is to return
Mexico, and by extension, Pemex to its former status as a major player in the
global energy market.133 As it currently exists, Pemex is far too degenerate
an institution to achieve this ambitious goal. The proponents of reform
measures hope that by introducing competition where there previously has
been none, primarily by allowing for the involvement of foreign entities and
investors, that Pemex will be forced to eradicate internal corruption and
revamp its structure in order to become more efficient.134 Thus, forcing
Pemex to function more like a private company and not an inefficient
government bureaucracy is crucial to the future of Mexico's energy
industry.i3
127. Id.
128. Id.
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132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

626

[VOL. 50, NO. 3

A critical secondary goal of the energy reform movement in Mexico is the
diversification of the industry within the country. 36 Such a goal is less
pertinent to the operations of Pemex than it is to electrical utilities and the
Comison Federal de Electricidada (CFE.)137 Where CFE previously
possessed a monopoly on the generation and wholesale supply of power, it is
hoped that ending the CFE's monopoly will create a wide open, competitive
market for electrical utilities.138 In short, by opening up the ability to both
generate and distribute electrical power, this will allow the participation in
the market of non-traditional suppliers and producers who utilize more
sustainable, non-traditional methods to generate electricity.139 The most
crucial aspect of this will be to ensure that all parties have access to the
electric grid and that discrimination does not occur.'0 Within the overall
reach of this secondary category is the idea of promoting renewable sources
of energy as well as the efficient use of energy by utilizing market incentives
to induce potential producers to develop such an industry in Mexico.u41
Another secondary goal of energy reform is to relieve Pemex of the
intense pressure it has to prop up the federal treasury. 142 The removal of
such a momentous burden will have obvious benefits for Pemex, but the
government must create an adequate replacement. It has been announced
that in lieu of Pemex serving as a piggy bank, a national development trust
will be created and funded by income from the extraction and production of
petroleum.143 The Banco de Mexico will serve as the administrator of this
developmental trust, which will be used to support pensions, investments in
infrastructure, and will fund grants for scientific research as well as for
scholarships.'- The model for this is the national oil trust in use by Norway
and funded by the operations of the Norwegian state-owned firm, Statoil.4s
With such an alternative funding structure in place, it is hoped that Pemex
will be released from the shackles which inhibit its strategic planning and
operations.

V.

Initial Legal Changes

The goals of any reform platform are abstract and intangible until they are
codified into law. As described above, the express intent of the reformatory
efforts is to modernize the energy industry. In order to do so, the legal
mechanisms which have allowed for the stagnation of energy production and
infrastructure development must be eradicated. This section will briefly
136.
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summarize the changes that have already occurred, and explore the intricate
details by which the reformists seek to accomplish their underlying goals.
Note, however, that the speed at which a system of laws is modified does not
occur rapidly. The process is still ongoing. Thus, this section will touch on
only those matters that have been enacted in full.

A.

A SUMMARY

OF THE LEGAL CHANGES

In December 2013, Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Mexican Constitution
were amended to allow for a variety of contracts and investment models in
the nation's hydrocarbon resources.-4 While the amendments stipulate that
the nation retains legal ownership of the hydrocarbons under the soil, Pemex
no longer has the exclusive right to explore the country for oil and gas
deposits, as well as their subsequent extraction.147 By August 2014, the
majority of the comprehensive energy reform measures and proposals were
enacted into law.148

The new laws are intended to serve two important purposes. Firstly,
changes have been made to the tax regime and finance laws in order to
attract foreign oil producers.149 Secondly, Pemex's tax liability and other
obligations have been reduced in order to allow the state run entity to
become more competitive.so The new legal measures often serve both
purposes simultaneously. For example, royalty payments were not needed
when Pemex had exclusive extraction rights for all of Mexico's
hydrocarbons.'s5 The government simply could tax the revenue accrued by
Pemex, and had no need for a more intricate system of raising revenue from
the extraction process.1 52 Consequently, when royalty measures were
codified in 2014, it was stipulated that all royalty payments will be to the
Mexican Petroleum Fund alone.153 Thus, potential investors can work
estimated royalty payments into their decision making process, and Pemex
will be partially relieved of the need to be the nation's primary source of
revenue.1 54 Likewise, the cap of cost deductions at a rate of $6.50/barrel of
oil creates certainty for the potential tax obligation of foreign producers and
benefits Pemex, as it reduces the entity's tax liability as well.155
146. Mexico enacts sweeping energy reform affecting the oil and gas industry, ERNST & YOUNG, WWW
.ey.com/Publication/vwLuAssets/ey-energy-alert-Mexico-enacts-sweeping-energy-reformaffecting-the-oil-and-gas-industry/$file/ey-energy-alert-Mexico-enacts-sweeping-energy-

reform-affecting-the-oil-and-gas-industry.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
147. Id.
148. Diana Villiers Negroponte, Mexico's Energy Reforms Become Law, BROOKINGS, https://www
.brookings.edu/articles/Mexicos-energy-reforms-become-law/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
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When viewed collectively, the measures passed in 2014 are conservative in
outlook.156 The state has not relinquished its total legal ownership of all
minerals,

including hydrocarbons,

beneath

Mexico's

sovereign soil.157

Pemex will still be a major player in the national energy industry.158 Instead
of having to bear all costs, Pemex will seek to partner with private entities to
develop the oil fields it has retained the rights to extract hydrocarbons
from.59 The ability to allocate risks as well as the capital investments

necessary to drill either on land or in the Gulf of Mexico will allow Pemex to
reduce its expenditures while benefiting from the advanced technology and
60
skill of foreign oil concerns.o
One of the most interesting measures stipulates that ownership of
equipment and materials utilized in the extraction of oil and gas must be
transferred to the Mexican government without charge upon termination of
a license to extract hydrocarbons from the subterranean soil.161 This would

occur only if the entity that owns such equipment is the one that has directly
contracted with the government.1 62 Any equipment owned by a contractor
that is not in privity with the government would be exempt from this
provision.163 Additionally, all entities must also be incorporated under
Mexican law and be located within the country for purposes of taxation.4
The Mexican court system will serve as the forum for adjudication of all
disputes.165 Such provisions are compatible with the government's objective
of allowing for foreign investment and participation in the development of
the energy industry all while reserving the ability to dictate exactly how such
involvement may occur.
B.

THE FIBRA E TAX REGIME

1.

Creation + Purpose of the FIBRA E Regime

As part of the energy reform objectives, the Mexican government has a
pressing need to create a means by which foreign concerns and investors
would serve as the primary source of investment capital for projects within
156. Mexico enacts sweeping energy reform affecting the oil and gas industry, supra note 146.
157. Id.
158. Ricardo Garcia-Moreno, The Changing Future in Mexico's Oil & Gas Industry: Growth and
Expansion, THE OIL AND GAs CONFERENCE 5, http://www.theoilandgasconference.com/down
loadsTOGC_2016/Fhe-Changing-Future-of-Mexicos-oil.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The Oil & Gas Fiscal Regime in Mexico, DELOrYTE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
GROUP, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/Mx/Documents/tax/2-OilGasFis
calRegime.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
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the energy and infrastructure sectors.-66 Ultimately, the budgets of Pemex
and the CFE need to be reduced, but the need to fund ongoing operations
remains.167 Thus, there existed a need to create a vehicle through which to
channel infusions of capital to domestic entities in the fields of energy, utility
service, and infrastructure that would be attractive to foreign investors.168
This vehicle would have to effectively replace both Pemex and the CFE as
the primary source of funding, especially for ongoing electric or energy
operations.169

Such an investment vehicle was officially created in September 2015, and
was slated to go into effect in October of the same year.170 This vehicle was
called the Fidei Comiso de Inversion en Energia e Infraestructura (FibraE).171 The Fibra-E is effectively the tax regime for a Mexican Real Estate
Investment Trust, or Fibra, adapted for use in the energy industry, or as
some commentators have described it, the Master Limited Partnership
structure from the United States adapted to Mexican tax law.172
Furthermore, the Fibra-E serves as the issuing entity of a security that is
capable of being quoted on stock exchanges.173 What would be securitized
are mature assets in oil, gas, energy, or infrastructure.174 Mature Assets were
chosen specifically because these assets already have a track record of
production, and thus, a rate of return on a potential investment can be
quickly discerned, and subsequently marketed to prospective investors.175
2.

Basic Structure of a Fibra E

All Fibra E's are required to take the form of a trust created in accordance
with applicable Mexican law.176 The entity that serves as the trustee must be
a banking institution or authorized brokerage residing in Mexico.177 Once a
Fibra E is created, the trustee is required to issue security certificates, known
as Certificados Bursatil Fiduciaros (CBFI), and register the CBFIs with the
166. Santiago Diaz Rivera & Enrique Perez Grovas, PositiveAmendments to the Mexican FibraE
Tax Regime, USM CocNE www.usmcocne.org/newsletter/Summer2016/AmendmentstoFibraE
Rules(EPG).pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Carlos Enrique Naime Haddad & Ricardo Rendon Pimental, Mexico: Mexico FIBRA-E: An
Update On The Investment Opportunities MONDAQ www.mondaq.com/mexico/x/534640/com
modities+derivative+stock+Exchanges/Mexican+FibraE+An+Update+On+The+Investment+Op
portunities (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
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176. Mexico's FIBRA E tax regulations, ERNsT & YOUNG, www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/ey-Mexico-fibra-e-tax-regulations/$File/ey-Mexicos-fibra-e-tax-regulations.pdf
(last visited, Aug. 20, 2017).
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National Securities Register.178 It is also important to note that the Fibra E
is an equity instrument; as such, it is not required under applicable law to
have a credit rating.179 The trustee will be required to distribute a dividend
to CBFI holders at least once a year.so The dividends distributed must
comprise at a minunimum, ninety-five percent of the Fibra E's taxable income
for that fiscal year.181 The distribution requirement is specifically designed
to make the Fibra E an attractive investment vehicle.182 A Fibra E must have
an extensive trust agreement that governs how it will operate. 83 As stated
above, ninety-five percent of the Fibra E's taxable income must be
distributed, however, this amount does not include certain expenses.1 84 A
Fibra E must pay fees to the trustee, commissions to managers, and retain a
certain threshold amount that allows the trust to continue to function
properly.185 Such a prudent reserve would vary and would depend upon
both the total size of the corpus of the trust and the provisions of the trust
agreement.1 86 A Fibra E trust may also repurchase CBFIs it has issued,
provided that the funds utilized to do so are derived from the reserve it
maintains to keep the fund operating.187
A Fibra E does not own any assets outright.188 Instead, legal entities
known as a "Promoted Companies" will own any assets, while the Fibra-E is
as a shareholder of the promoted companies.189 In addition to owning the
assets, the Promoted Companies are treated as a pass-thru tax entity by
Mexican tax law, so it will not be taxed at the corporate level.19 For all
intents and purposes, Promoted Companies are business trusts.191 A
Promoted Company is tied into the Fibra-E structure by the requirement
that all of its shareholders be legal entities that have their tax situs in
Mexico.192 Similarly, a Fibra E is required to invest seventy percent of its
funds in shares of Promoted Companies.193 It is also important to the note
that any Pemex owned subsidiary will not qualify as a Promoted
Company.194 Also, any entity that has directly contracted with the National
178. Id. at 3.
179. New Fibra-E investment Structure for the Energy Industry in Mexico,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, https://www.pwc.com/nmxles/impuestos/archivo/2015001-Ti5boletin-nueva-fibra-e-en.pdf (last visited, Aug. 20, 2017).
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Hydrocarbons Commission cannot be a Promoted Company.195 In theory,
an entity under contract with the National Hydrocarbons Commission will
be engaged in a Pemex related project.196
A Promoted Company is required to generate at least ninety percent of its
income from a specified category of business endeavors that are known as
"exclusive activities."197 The first category of exclusive activities relates to
the refining, treatment, transportation, and storage of both petroleum and
natural gas.1 98 The second category involves the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity.199 The third category involves infrastructure
projects that are designed to ultimately benefit the public sector. 200 While
the third category of exclusive activities does not appear to be related to the
energy industry, the category encompasses such things as highways,
railroads, port facilities, and airfields that from an operational view, are
critical to the energy industry as a whole.201 It is further mandated that a
project that fits the definition of the third category must be both operational
and have seven years of remaining useful class life under the applicable
Mexican tax regime.202 With regards to the third category of exclusive
activities, it is apparent that this particular category was included because the
government wishes to modernize the entire energy industry, not just the
facets that involve exploration, extraction or the production of petroleum or
natural gas products.203 Furthermore, the projects within the third category
are likely in need of the infusion of capital.204
The tax treatment of the Fibra E necessarily begins with the Promoted
Companies it owns shares in, since such companies are pass thru entities.205
In the event that a Promoted Company was to incur a net tax loss in a fiscal
year, it would not be able to apportion the loss among the Fibra E's that are
its shareholders.206 Instead, the Promoted Company that incurred the loss
would have to use the loss to offset tax liability resulting from any future
gains.207 The Fibra E itself will not be taxed on the income it receives from
the Promoted Companies it owns shares in; only the holders of CBFI's in
the Fibra E are required to pay taxes. 208 A holder of a CBFI will owe taxes to
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Mexico's FIBRA E tax regulations, ERNs-r & YOUNG, www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs
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the government based upon the amount of the dividend distributed to them
by the Fibra E.209 Additionally, tax will be owed by a CBFI holder upon sale,
since a CBFI issued by a Fibra E is alienable.210 However, there is a special
provision in the applicable tax regime for foreign investors.211 If a foreign
investor sells the CBFI he possesses to other investors in an established
marketplace, he will be exempt from paying income tax to the Mexican
government on the amount realized from the sale.212 With regards to the
last statement, it is not yet apparent what the tax authorities regard as an
appropriate marketplace, but it is likely that such a sale should be conducted
within Mexico.213
Since the Fibra E was officially created in September of 2015, there is
little information out there on the evolution of this instrument or if any
problems have arisen since its inception.214 The subsection below will serve
as a substitute for examining how a similar investment vehicle has been
received by investors.

C.

FIBRA

The Fibra E will not be the first instance in which Mexico has utilized a
pass-thru, trust like structure for the purpose of utilizing foreign and private
capital sources. 215 A brief examination of a similar tax regime specifically
structured for the real estate industry may shed some light on the potential
issues and expected outcomes the Fibra E vehicle may face in the near
future.216 In 2011, the Mexican government created the FIBRA (Fibra),
which is a real-estate investment trust (REIT), a popular investment vehicle
in real property in the United States adapted for the local tax regime.217 A
REIT bundles various and sundry real estate portfolios for sale on the stock
market and pays out dividends to investors, which are derived from the rents
collected on the leases of the property. 218 This investment vehicle was
specifically created to give real estate developers access to the public equity
market as well as enable individual investors to buy investments in
209. Rivera & Grovas, supra note 166.
210. Haddad, supra note 171.
211. Id.
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commercial property.219 A Fibra would not be assessed a corporate income
tax under the domestic tax regime as long as all income was distributed
directly to the investors as dividends.220
However, in the initial two years after the Fibra was created, the signs
were not encouraging.221 In the years 2011-2013, only six Fibras were
created in total; of a national real estate market valued at $370 billion, the
Fibras only possessed an estimated $8.3 billion slice of the overall market.222

The failure of the Fibra to have a successful launch as hoped for has been
attributed to investor reluctance.223 Among the major investor concerns is
the fact that the Fibra's do not possess governance or management internal
governance provisions that are favorable to investors.224 Many of the Fibras
were founded by wealthy and influential individuals who also owned the
majority of the companies charged with the management of the Fibra.225
Since such external management entities charge fees based on the valuation
of assets and acquisitions made by the Fibra, investors are wary of selfdealing or outright fraud.226 Ultimately, in order to be a more attractive
investment option, individual Fibra's must demonstrate utter transparency
and a management structure answerable to investors only.227

VI.

Cross Border Pipelines: A Case Study

Up until the end of the second millennium, Mexico was self-sufficient in
228
However, by the
terms of supplying natural gas to all internal consumers.
supply.229 The
available
the
far
outstripped
demand
end of the year 2000,
inability to react to the change in the market was a result of Pemex's decision
to refrain from both investing in exploring for deposits and extracting
23
substantial quantities of natural gas. 0 Since then, Mexico has become a net
importer, and currently imports forty percent of the natural gas it consumes
from the United States.231 Additionally, due to the increasing popularity of
natural gas for the generation of electricity and for industrial uses, Mexico is
expected to import up to ten percent of total U.S. natural gas produced in
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the near future.232 What has occurred in recent years regarding the
partnership of Mexican entities with foreign investors offers a glimpse into
how positive international partnerships in the energy sector can be as well as
the potential such collaborations have for investors.
The surge in demand for American natural gas has exposed a weakness in
Mexico's energy infrastructure and transportation networks.233 With
projections indicating that total U.S. natural gas exports to Mexico are likely
to reach 3.8 billion cubic feet per day by 2018, Mexico would require
extensive natural gas pipeline networks in order to both transport and store
the natural gas. 2 34 However, Mexico's network of natural gas pipelines is
dramatically eclipsed by the pipelines in Texas alone.235 This presents a
daunting obstacle that unless ameliorated, would serve to bar rather than
facilitate the importation of natural gas.
While not widely known, Mexico actually opened up the midstream
sector, or pipeline operation and construction, to both private and foreign
investors in 1997.236 However, this development was not met with
enthusiasm by the private sector nor by investors abroad.237 This was due to
the fact that Pemex had complete control of the natural gas industry at that
time as well as the fact that the Mexican tax regime offered little or no
incentives to foreign investors looking to possibly be involved in energy
related projects.238 What developments have occurred since then with
regards to natural gas pipelines offers a glimpse of what can occur when the
Mexicans desire to collaborate with private firms and investors towards
mutually beneficial ends.
The incarnation that such a mutually beneficial project has taken is that of
a joint venture. 239 A current example would be a joint venture between
Pemex, and U.S. firms, BlackRock and First Reserve, for the purpose of
constructing a pipeline by which to export natural gas produced in Texas
down into Mexico.240 BlackRock, which is an asset manager, and First
Reserve, a private equity firm, have taken a joint stake worth $900 million in
the second phase of the Los Ramones project.241 The position taken by the
Americans comprises about forty-five percent of the construction costs
232. Id.
233. Mexico's Emerging Infastructure Opportunity, ERNST& YOUNG www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/EY-Mexicos-emerging-infastructire-opportuity/$File/EY-Mexico's-emerginginfastructure-opportunity.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
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The Los Ramones project will be utilized to
transport gas from Mexico's northern border to the central region of the
according to Pemex.242
Country.

24 3

The Los Ramones project serves to indicate how quickly the critical
development of necessary infrastructure can be accomplished when
identified as a priority. Additionally, the Los Ramones project is a good case
study of a project that has commenced after the enactment of energy
reforms began.244 In the forty years prior to 2012, there had been no
development of a natural gas pipeline project within Mexico.245 Pemex
projected annual growth in the 'domestic supply of natural gas being
produced to be eclipsed by the projected increase in natural gas usage. 246
One of the primary reasons for this was the fact that many power plants were
converting from utilizing oil to using natural gas as their primary fuel
source. 247 Thus, Pemex conceived a project that would transport American
natural gas first into the northern states of Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, with
the second phase of the project transporting the natural gas down into the
centrally located Mexican states.248
Overall, Pemex sought to develop four pipelines that would have a
combined length of over 1,000 kilometers.249 To this end, four special
purpose entities were created and a bidding process was opened up to both
private and foreign entities in July 2012.250 Though bidding entities had to
meet certain pre qualifications involving demonstrated expertise in pipeline
construction in order to eligible to participate in the bidding, what was
offered in return was particularly intriguing.251 The winning entity would
receive a special discounted rate on the importation tariff of natural gas. 252
While the winning bidder would have to provide all investment funding, in
return it would obtain ninety percent ownership of the special purpose entity
created by Pemex for the pipeline project253 Pemex, or in the case of one
segment of the Los Ramones project, its subsidiary, would retain ten percent
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Presentation on Los Ramones Phase I, PEIMEx, www.gas.pemex.com/NR/rdonlyres/014D49
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ownership due to the fact that Pemex would be enlisted to maintain and
operate the pipeline.254
The Los Ramones project has the potential to be a rather lucrative
undertaking, especially for the foreign investors. All told, the natural gas
pipeline will run from an export hub in Agua Dulce, Texas all the way down
to Guanajuato in central Mexico.255 This particular pipeline is expected to
supply roughly twenty percent of Mexico's total demand natural gas in the
near future.256 The total project is projected to have cost $2.3 billion overall

and is one of the largest investments in Mexican infrastructure.257 The
demand for natural gas in Mexico will not be a passing phase either. As
previously stated herein, many power plants are converting to the use of
natural gas as the primary fuel source with which to generate electricity.258
Furthermore, manufacturers are also expected to incase their consumption
of natural gas as a fuel source. 259 Once the Los Ramones pipeline is
operating at full capacity, it is projected that it alone will boost total exports
of U.S. natural gas by seventeen to twenty-two percent. 260 This will be
attractive to American producers of oil and gas, for the extraction of oil from
shale formations has left them with excess supplies of natural gas in need of a
home.261

However, the Los Ramones project would simply not have been
conceivable prior to the commencement of the energy reform process. 262
Though demand for natural gas by both industrial concerns and household
consumers was increasing, the demand exceeded what domestic supply could
be produced.263 A neighboring nation has an abundant, readily available
supply of natural gas. 264 However, Mexico lacked the infrastructure
necessary to transfer the product directly to consumers. 265 Previous attempts
to solicit investments have failed due to the dominance of Pemex in the
market and an unfavorable tax regime.266 However, the reforming of the
Mexican energy industry means that what was once inconceivable is now
achievable. The deregulation of Mexico's energy market and the steps
254. Presentationon Los Ramones Phase H, PEMEx, www.gas.pemex.com/NR'rdonlyres/014D49
D7-5E7A-4103-A8CA-2C5F2B1187ID/0/PresentationLosRamonesPhasell2May2Ol3.pdf (last
visited Aug. 8, 2017).
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undertaken to dismantle the state-owned energy monopolies has meant that
it is both easier and attractive for private or foreign investors to develop
pipeline projects.267 Thus, if the demand of consumers for natural gas meets
or exceeds the projections of analysts, there will be a rush by other investors
to follow the lead of BlackRock and First Reserve. The ability to own ninety
percent of a crucial fuel conduit would be a sound, long-term investment.268
The Los Ramones project and other pipeline endeavors represent what is
achievable when Mexico, and by extension, Pemex, are willing to partner
with private or foreign entities on energy development.

VII.

Conclusion

Mexico was at an important crossroads in the second decade of the
twenty-first century. Since 1938, Mexico, and Mexico alone, had been in
complete control over the extraction of hydrocarbons and production of
energy within its borders. However, energy policy and practices have been
far too shortsighted in nature, and there was a serious lack of long term
planning. The state-owned oil company, Pemex, was treated as a lucrative
source of cash by the Mexican government, as substantial profits accrued by
the company were deposited directly into the federal treasury. Unlike a
private entity of a similar size, profits were not retained nor reinvested into
the company. Thus, when similarly sized private competitors might utilize
retained earnings to develop new extraction or exploration technologies,
train their workforce or simply reserve the cash for future investments,
Pemex relinquished the funds. The entity was effectively a cash cow for the
federal government, employees with guaranteed lifetime employment and
union leaders. Everything was fine until the wheels began to fall off the
train, and the proverbial chickens came home to roost. As current
producing oil fields began to experience declines in the rate of production, it
soon became apparent that Pemex had failed to explore, identify, and
prepare to extract from new reservoirs or deposits of fossil fuels. While
Mexico's northern neighbor, the United States experienced an oil boom in
the extraction of hydrocarbons from shale formations, Pemex lacked the
capability, expertise, and technology to do the same. 269 Instead, Pemex
drilled a few test wells in Mexico's portion of the Eagle Ford Formation and
did little beyond that.270 Furthermore, the dependence of the government
upon the state-owned entity to subsidize government spending effectively
meant that it would be difficult for Pemex to issue debt as a means of
funding the exploitation of new hydrocarbon fields. Indeed, when the
government estimates that an estimated $350 billion is the amount needed
to modernize the energy industry in Mexico, it became apparent that the
assumption of debt or the issuance of debt would not be able to raise this
267.
268.
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270.
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amount of capital.271 The solicitation of capital from foreign investors was
the only manner by which to accomplish the modernization of Mexican
energy related industry and infrastructure without effectively mortgaging
the entire country.
However, to allow for the participation of foreigners in the energy
industry would be politically risky, for the oil expropriation of 1938 is
ingrained in the collective Mexican psyche as an assertion of national
sovereignty, and was feted as a patriotic holiday each March 18th.272 In
2008, for example, the mere attempt to introduce rudimentary reforms in
the energy industry led to massive protests in the streets of Mexico City.273
Thus, the much needed energy reforms that were proposed in 2012
delicately balanced internal political sentiments with the stark reality of the
situation of the energy industry in Mexico.274 Consequently, the reforms
were not as radical in scope as they arguably should have been, but rather
reflected a compromise.275 Pemex and CFE would not be sold off nor
privatized; nor would the proposed constitutional changes relinquish the
state's ownership of its mineral resources. 276 Instead, the goal was to create
vehicles by which foreign investors and Pemex would partner to share both
the risk and profits from oil exploration and extraction projects.277 Thus,
neither investors nor Pemex would be forced to bear all the risks associated
with the difficulties of extraction of hydrocarbons in the deep-water oil fields
of the Gulf of Mexico, nor would more tantalizing, safer, and more
profitable projects like the extraction of oil and natural gas from shale
formations be reserved exclusively by Pemex.278
Certain projects have already proven to be popular or at the very least
perceived to be viable risks by foreign investors. For example, the
substantial investment by American entities BlackRock and First Reserve in
the Los Ramones natural gas pipelines is a clear indicator that investments in
Mexican energy are seen as worthwhile and potentially lucrative.279 Indeed,
the Los Ramones pipeline project best exemplifies the possibilities for
investors to profit off the supply of capital for energy infrastructure projects
within Mexico.280 The ending of the state monopoly on the energy industry
overall and the deregulation of the energy market within the country have
made possible what previously had been either prohibited by law or not
attractive.
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On the other hand, however, the vast potential of projects like the Los
Ramones pipeline could ultimately go unrealized. The theft of
hydrocarbons from pipelines occurs in every Mexican state, and the rate of
theft has increased dramatically since narcotics trafficking organizations
realized just how lucrative such a venture could be.282 With the exception of
a few isolated instances in which the military has protected pipelines, the
government, Pemex, and law enforcement have demonstrated ineptitude and
incompetence in their efforts to deter the illegal siphoning of hydrocarbons
from pipelines.283 While the hijacking of fuel trucks or stealing oil from
storage tanks may require little in the way of technical expertise, the tapping
of pressurized pipelines by contrast, certainly does.284 Such a fact indicates
that Pemex employees are moonlighting by stealing the oil from their
employer during daylight hours.285 Similarly, the failure of law enforcement
to prevent theft or even to investigate illegal pipeline taps evinces the
complicity of the police.286 Law enforcement in Mexico already has the
reputation of being an entrepreneurial activity, and with the illicit fuel sales
rumored to be a multi-billion dollar industry, it appears that this is but
another revenue stream for the police as well.287 An integral part of wooing
investors and foreign capital is inspiring confidence that such investments
will be protected by the rule of law and by law enforcement. Mexico simply
cannot achieve its energy reform oriented goals if its most apt comparison is
a kleptocracy, and not a country with a stable government.
Mexico's issues with attracting foreign investment do not end with
stability related concerns. The reform measures it has enacted so far are too
conservative in nature in order to achieve the goal of creating a modem
energy industry in the country. Measures such as requiring licensees to
relinquish their used equipment to the state upon expiration of a licensee are
highly questionable and evoke images of expropriation in the mind's eye.
Furthermore, a lot of the laws intended to reform the energy industry seem
to favor Pemex. Far too many opportunities that involve a possible
partnership with Pemex seem to favor the state owned company as opposed
to the entity with which it would be engaged in a venture with.
The investment vehicles also do nbt inspire much confidence. While the
structure of the Fibra E seems to offer transparency and certain advantages
to a potential investor, concerns abound. While the Fibra E has only been
around since 2015, a prudent investor conducting his due diligence need
only examine the performance of the Fibra E's predecessor, the Fibra and
see that there are matters of serious concern that must be addressed. While
a trust aspect of a Fibra E is both transparent and regulated, the potential for
abuse arises with the Promoted Companies. Like the external managers of a
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Fibra, a Promoted Company could engage in the overvaluation of its assets
or other deceptive acts that will be inimical to the interests of the investors
and have a significant impact on the dividend payments investors are owed.
The selection of managers for the Fibra E itself is perhaps the most critical
portion of creating such a fund. Competent and scrupulous managers would
likely be able to avoid risky investments and attract investors. The
investment process is still in its infancy, so much will have to transpire
before a definitive answer can be reached.
In conclusion, whether or not the energy industry in Mexico can
ultimately be modernized is entirely within control of its government. Many
of the reforms that have already been enacted are far too conservative to
achieve the goal of attracting foreign investors and infusing capital into the
energy industry. Mexico's natural resources are abundant and there likely
are deposits that have not yet been discovered. The government would do
well not to have the reforms seemingly serve to benefit Pemex while passing
the risk along to potential partners. Instead, the government should focus
on eradicating corruption and policing its citizens in order to make
investment in business within the country a venture that is less risk-prone.
Ultimately, the impetus is upon Mexico's leaders to be bold in their efforts,
for only the full measure of devotion to energy reform will yield the results
desired.

